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Abstract 
 
To determine whether a component is meeting its reliability requirement during 
production, acceptance sampling is employed in which selected units coming off the 
production line are subjected to additional environmental and/or destructive tests that 
are within the normal environment space to which the component is expected to be 
exposed throughout its life in the Stockpile. This report describes what these tests are 
and how they are scored for reliability purposes. The roles of screens, Engineering 
Use Only tests, and next assembly product acceptance testing are also discussed, 
along with both the advantages and disadvantages of environmental and destructive 
testing.   
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
 
DA Design Agency 
dB decibel 
D-Test Destructive Test 
E-Test Environmental Test 
EUO Engineering Use Only 
HALT Highly Accelerated Life Test 
HASS Highly Accelerated Stress Screen 
MC Military Characteristic 
PPI Process Prove-in 
STS Stockpile-to-Target Sequence 
UCL upper confidence limit 
WR War Reserve 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
 
Nuclear weapon reliability is defined to be the probability of achieving yield at the target across 
the normal Stockpile-to-Target Sequence (STS) environments throughout the weapon lifetime. 
As indicated in the definition, this probability must be estimated across all required normal 
environments and for the entire stockpile life of the weapon system. Concerns with system 
performance at end of life and in conjunction with normal environmental extremes arise from 
these considerations. The reliability engineer evaluates test conditions and test data according to 
whether they can be used to support this estimate. Thus, the basic question for the reliability 
engineer is how to relate test data and performance measurements to the expected performance 
of the weapon over the target. There is never sufficient data to fully characterize weapon 
performance across the entire test space defined in this manner. 
 
Environmental (E-) and Destructive (D-) tests performed during War Reserve (WR) production 
are an important source of data that can be used to indicate whether or not the component or 
subsystem will function properly during and after experiencing normal STS environments. 
 
E-tests and D-tests are intended to support assessment of the product’s ability to meet design, 
process, and manufacturing requirements [1]. These two types of tests have the following 
objectives: 
 
1. Provide an opportunity to test over the normal environment and usage state space, 
2. Detect defects early in production so that they can be fixed, and 
3. Provide data on representative hardware for reliability estimation. 
  
Hence, the focus behind these tests is both on improving inherent reliability and obtaining data 
necessary for providing a reliability estimate for the component and, if necessary, identifying 
issues that may require production or design changes to improve the inherent reliability. E-
testing and D-testing allow identification of design and production process issues that are 
apparent only when the subsystem or component is exposed to STS environments. Continued test 
success on randomly sampled units throughout the production run strengthens the assertion 
(beyond that provided by 100% testing) that the production process remains under control [2]. 
 
E-tests and D-tests provide the Reliability Engineer with the hard data required to either support 
or refute the original component event unreliability prediction(s). The reliability engineer will 
judge the applicability of every E- and D-test that the component experiences on how well 
completion of the test answers the following question [2]: 
 
If a component selected for testing were instead put into a weapon, would it have worked in 
that weapon at any time during its stockpile life under any valid normal STS operating 
conditions for that component? 
 
The following sections provide separate discussions that specifically relate to E-tests and D-tests, 
respectively, and their role in providing a reliability estimate of a component during WR 
production and acceptance. This report also describes hostile environments and screens, and 
discusses both the advantages and limitations of E- and D-testing. 
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2.  ENVIRONMENTAL TESTING 
 
2.1 Definition of Environmental Tests 
 
Environmental (or E-) tests are nondegrading tests [1, 3] that evaluate the functionality of a 
component either during or after the application of one or more normal environments (defined 
below). The normal environments defined for E-testing represent the range of those (normal) 
environments that may be encountered during stockpile life, as opposed to ambient conditions 
only. E-tests are not a screen and are performed on units selected by means of a product 
acceptance sampling algorithm (or sampling plan). The E-test results help determine the final 
acceptance of the product, and E-tested units are returned to the production flow and used in the 
next assembly [3]. E-tests are meant to demonstrate environmental capability but not to degrade 
the ability of the device to experience the full normal STS environments and function properly. 
 
A normal environment is an expected logistical storage and operational environment, as defined 
in the weapon’s STS and Military Characteristics (MCs), which the weapon is required to 
experience without degradation in operational reliability [4]. 
 
Only multi-shot components and subassemblies (i.e., components and subassemblies that can be 
functioned multiple times) are candidates for an E-test. The E-test must not degrade the 
component to the point that it is unable, from a design standpoint, to survive a life in the 
stockpile at the completion of the test. Demonstration that any performance degradation from the 
E-test is within an acceptable limit must occur during the development and qualification program 
[2]. 
 
An E-test does not necessarily have to represent an entire life in the stockpile. Rather, it should 
provide sufficient environmental exposure to reveal any defect in the component that would have 
resulted in a stockpile use failure [2]. 
 
2.2 Purpose of E-Tests 
 
E-tests are performed to monitor the quality and reliability of a component during WR 
production without incurring the cost of scrapping tested units. Selected units that undergo and 
successfully pass the E-tests can be yielded to either the next assembly or to WR stores, since no 
significant degradation of the units has occurred as a result of the testing. They can also be 
designated to undergo subsequent D-tests. 
 
E-test results generally contribute to the data base used by the Reliability organization for 
component assessment, determining whether the product is meeting its reliability requirement as 
it is produced. 
 
2.3 Determination of E-Tests 
 
As stated above, E-test environments represent the range of those normal environments that may 
be encountered during stockpile life in which there is no degradation of the component. Non-
degrading environments that represent normal stockpile environments and are, therefore, 
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applicable for E-tests are determined from development and qualification testing, as well as 
Process Prove-in (PPI) [2]. 
 
An example of an E-test suite may be thermal cycling and random vibration tests at levels below 
the normal environment extremes, such as at those environmental levels that are, say, 3dB below 
the normal environment maximums. Such tests might be employed because the E-tests cannot be 
performed at the normal environment extremes without degradation. Thus, a compromise is 
made by coming down 3dB from these extremes, although reliance on tests at these levels 
introduces some uncertainty into the reliability estimates. [Note: 3 dB below the maximum level 
means the following mathematically ⎯ (10)(log10 P1/P0) = -3, resulting in P1 = ½ P0, where P1 
represents the test and environment and P0 represents the normal environment maximum.]  
Another example of an E-test suite is that used by the radar design groups whereby a suite of E-
tests is defined such that the unit can survive undergoing the suite three times without 
degradation. For this particular program, it was judged that this suite of E-tests was acceptable. 
 
For a reliability assessment of a component or subsystem, the ideal situation would be to have 
complete characterization across the normal STS environments. However, the reality is that it is 
not always possible to test at the normal environment extremes and still accept product for WR 
use. Thus, cost considerations drive the compromises made in developing the E-test suite. 
Because of the necessity of these compromises, there are no hard and fast rules regarding how E-
tests are defined, other than that they do demonstrate environmental capability to the greatest 
degree possible while still not degrading the expected component or subsystem performance. 
 
2.4 How Reliability Uses Component and Next Assembly E-Tests 
 
2.4.1 Component E-Tests During Product Acceptance 
 
During component WR production, a unit that is selected for E-testing undergoes a series of tests 
representing selected normal thermal and mechanical environments. This entire suite of E-tests 
constitutes one E-test for scoring reliability failure events. While this suite is indicative of 
device performance in all environments to which it is subjected, it is only one device and 
represents a selected range, among many, of the expected normal logistical and operational 
environments to which the component may be exposed. As stated above, the E-test results 
contribute to the data base used by the Reliability organization for assessing the component to 
determine whether the product is meeting its reliability requirement as it is produced. 
 
As a matter of practical compromise between the number of parts and the amount of testing that 
can be reasonably performed, component E-tests are not always carried out at the lowest level, 
such as at the resistor or transistor level. 
 
2.4.2 Component E-Tests During Next Assembly Product Acceptance 
 
Next assembly E-testing may be performed in which the component is exercised with respect to 
its WR function. Such testing may provide the opportunity to more completely test the unit with 
proper interfaces and can, therefore, provide additional data for the reliability assessment of the 
component. On the other hand, there has not been a known situation in which a component 
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required next assembly testing to demonstrate that it met its reliability requirement. The E-tests 
(and D-tests) for a component that are called out in the component’s product specification (PS) 
are used to help provide evidence as to whether the component is not meeting its reliability 
allocation on its own without requiring next assembly product acceptance testing as part of this 
demonstration. If the reliability requirement is too stringent, then the sample sizes used in E- and 
D-tests will be too small to demonstrate that the requirement is being met. 
 
It has been suggested that savings could be realized by relying solely on the use of E-testing at 
the next assembly level, rather than at the component level, to demonstrate that component 
requirements are being met. This is not recommended for the following reasons: 
 
1. E-testing at the next assembly level, rather than at the component level, means that it will 
take longer to find any problems. If a problem exists, then there is the potential that the 
entire next assembly will have to be discarded, rather than just the component in 
question. Also, more components would have been produced before discovering the 
problem. Rework and scrap are more expensive at the next assembly level rather than at 
the component level; thus, any savings resulting from reduced testing could be lost when 
problems are encountered. 
2. Although potential interface issues may be identified at the next assembly level, the 
ability to make certain measurements on the component will be compromised. 
3. The higher the level of assembly, the fewer number of tests available for reliability 
scoring at the component or subsystem level, since the sampling rate at the next assembly 
level is based on the lower reliability requirement at that level. Hence, the number of tests 
may be insufficient to demonstrate component performance with respect to the reliability 
failure event description under consideration. Because testing is imperfect, one test 
cannot be depended upon to detect all possible defects. 
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3.  DESTRUCTIVE TESTS 
 
3.1 Definition of Destructive Tests 
 
D-tests are destructive or degrading tests (i.e., resulting in either destroying the component or 
losing design margin) that evaluate the functionality of a component either during or after the 
application of one or more normal environments. The normal environments defined for D-
testing represent the range of those (normal) environments that may be encountered during 
stockpile life, as opposed to ambient conditions only. However, the particular D-tests represent 
(a) the normal environment extremes, (b) an increased exposure to selected normal 
environments, such as thermal cycling in which a particular D-test may consist of three times the 
E-test thermal cycling, or (c) an increased number of component functional WR operations, such 
as stronglink reset/enable operations, in a given normal environment or set of normal 
environments. D-tests may be an extension of the E-tests, in which a fraction of the samples that 
have successfully undergone E-testing is selected for D-testing, in accordance with a product 
acceptance sampling plan or algorithm [1]. In addition, any functional testing of one-shot devices 
(e.g. detonators, valves, ferroelectric firing sets, etc.) as part of production sampling are, by 
definition, D-tests. 
 
D-tests are sometimes designed to represent all environments that a unit could be exposed to 
during the normal life of the component. D-test environment levels must not exceed normal 
environment levels, so there is no question of overtest-induced failures. However, since the most 
stressing environments for the component in question may not be known a priori, stressing 
across the entire normal STS environmental spectrum will therefore include the worst-case 
environments. Over time, these worst-case environments may become known as a result of 
fallouts. 
 
As in the case of E-tests, D-tests are not a screen, and the D-test results can help determine the 
final acceptance of the product. 
 
3.2 Purpose of D-Tests 
 
D-tests are performed to monitor the quality and reliability of a component during the course of 
WR production. The units that undergo D-testing cannot yield to the next assembly or to WR 
stores. After testing, D-test units are occasionally disassembled to assess potential degradation. 
Thus, D-testing not only provides a demonstration of product life, but also provides a check on 
the manufacturing process. 
 
D-test results contribute to the data base used by the Reliability organization for assessing the 
component reliability failure events to determine whether the product is meeting its reliability 
requirement as it is produced. 
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3.3 Determination of D-Tests 
 
As stated above in the case for E-tests, D-tests also represent the range of those normal 
environments that may be encountered during stockpile life; however, these are degrading tests 
that can be, at the normal environment extremes, because of either increased exposure to selected 
environments or increased WR functional operations in selected normal environments. As with 
the E-tests, applicable D-tests are determined from development testing, as well as Process 
Prove-in (PPI). The goal of a D-test is to represent a life in the stockpile with functionality at the 
extreme(s) of the normal delivery environments. In addition, combined environments used in the 
D-test must be compatible; that is, the test levels must represent reality. For example, a flight 
vibration environment will not be seen at an STS low-temperature storage extreme.   
 
An example of a D-test suite may be thermal cycling, followed by mechanical shock and random 
vibration tests at maximum normal STS environment levels. As stated earlier, the unit may be 
taken apart upon completion of the tests and evaluated for degradation. 
 
3.4 How Reliability Uses Component and Next Assembly D-Tests 
 
3.4.1 Component D-Tests During Product Acceptance 
 
During component WR production, a unit selected for D-testing undergoes a series of D-tests 
representing selected normal thermal and mechanical environments. This entire suite constitutes 
one D-test for reliability scoring purposes, since it is a single sample and represents a selected 
range, among many, of the expected normal logistical and operational environments to which the 
component may be exposed. As stated above, the D-test results contribute to the data base used 
by the Reliability organization as evidence whether the component is not meeting its reliability 
requirement as it is being produced. 
 
3.4.2 Component D-Tests During Next Assembly Product Acceptance 
 
Next assembly D-testing may be performed in which the component, which has not undergone 
any prior D-testing, is exercised with respect to its WR function. Such testing may provide the 
opportunity to more completely test the unit and can, therefore, provide additional data for the 
reliability assessment of the component. On the other hand, as stated above for the E-tests, there 
has not been a known situation where assessment of a component required next assembly testing  
to accumulate sufficient data to demonstrate that it met its reliability requirement. Both the E-
tests and D-tests for a component that are called out in the component’s product specification 
(PS) are used to assess component reliability. 
 
It has been suggested that savings could be realized by relying solely on the use of D-testing at 
the next assembly level, rather than at the component level, to demonstrate component 
performance. This is not a good idea for the following reasons: 
 
1. D-testing at the next assembly level, rather than at the component level, means that it will 
take longer to find any component-specific problems.   
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2. There may not be enough D-test samples at the next assembly level to help demonstrate 
reliability because of the cost of the next assembly unit vs. that for the component. 
3. Although potential interface issues may be identified at the next assembly level, the 
ability to make component-level measurements is compromised. 
4. The higher the level of assembly, the fewer number of tests available for reliability 
scoring. Hence, the number of tests may be insufficient to demonstrate performance with 
respect to the reliability failure event description under consideration. Because testing is 
imperfect, one test cannot be depended upon to detect all possible defects. 
5. Rework and scrap at the next assembly level is more expensive than at the component 
level. Thus, any savings resulting from reduced testing could be lost if any problems are 
encountered. 
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4.  OTHER TESTS AND EVALUATIONS 
 
4.1 Hostile Environment Testing 
 
In hostile environments, the unit is expected to survive and function “without severe degradation 
in reliability.” If there is no numerical requirement associated with this definition, hostile 
environment tests cannot be scored directly for reliability purposes, but may provide insight 
regarding the reliability of the component. Hostile environment testing is usually part of what is 
typically referred to as Engineering Use Only (EUO) tests. 
 
4.2 Destructive vs. Engineering Use Only Tests 
 
D-tests are not to be confused with EUO tests, which are used to determine the product design 
margin. Any EUO tests that are planned must be done at the end of D-testing for the following 
reason: If an EUO test is performed before D-testing and a product failure occurs during the 
subsequent D-tests, it cannot be determined whether the failure was because of the D-test(s) or  
the EUO test. 
 
4.3 Screens 
 
Screens, such as 100% tests, provide a means of assuring product quality and the stability of the 
production processes by weeding out infant mortality failures. However, they are generally not 
considered useful for reliability scoring purposes, since failures are normally rejected and only 
successful units accepted. Thus, the test results characterize the incoming population to the 
screen, but not the out-going population from the screen. Furthermore, screens are generally not 
intended to demonstrate that the unit will work in the use environments. 
 
 
4.3.1 HALT and HASS vs. E- and D-Testing 
 
Another type of screen is referred to as Highly Accelerated Stress Screens (HASS), which are 
used in the screening of production items on a 100% basis using stresses substantially higher 
than those experienced in normal use, including shipping and storage. The accelerated stresses 
are applied in production to shorten the time to failure of the defective units and, therefore, 
shorten the corrective action time and the number of units built with the same flaw. HASS may 
also include stresses that do not occur in expected use if these stresses help locate flaws that 
would occur in an expected field environment [5]. HASS is generally not advisable unless a 
comprehensive Highly Accelerated Life Test (HALT) has been performed during the design 
phase of a product, in which every stimulus of potential value is used under accelerated test 
conditions to find the weak links in the design and fabrication processes [6]. Without the 
confidence in product robustness that HALT provides, the acceptable stress levels in production 
screens must be limited, preventing the large accelerations of flaw precipitation and time 
compression [7].  
 
The stresses used in HALT and HASS include, but are not restricted to, all-axis simultaneous 
vibration, high-rate broad-range temperature cycling, power cycling, voltage and frequency 
15 
variation, humidity, and any other stresses that may expose design or process problems. No 
attempt is made to simulate the field environment ⎯ one only seeks to find design and process 
flaws by any means possible. The stresses used generally far exceed the field environments in 
order to gain time compression; that is, to shorten the time required to find any problem areas. 
When a weakness is discovered, only the failure mode and mechanism are of importance; the 
relation of the stress used to the field environment is of no consequence [8].  
 
HASS results are not used for reliability scoring purposes for the following reasons [9]: 
 
1. HASS does not appear to offer opportunities to collect key data for reliability 
estimation purposes. HASS is defined to be a 100% screen. Since it is a 100% screen 
whereby faulty or weak manufacturing product is removed prior to shipment, the data 
from these screened units cannot be used for estimating reliability because they are 
not representative of the performance of material in the stockpile. E- and D-tests are 
an important source of reliability data, and HASS, as it is strictly defined, does not 
replace it. 
 
2. HASS may stimulate defects that are unique to non-representative environments. 
Because Design Agency (DA) components and systems are assessed over the 
intended stockpile life and the range of normal environments, it is not clear how 
HASS results could be used in performing a reliability assessment, since there would 
be no production test data pertaining to normal STS environments. Any observed 
defects would require investigation to ensure that they were not the result of an 
overtest. This is also a concern for E- and D-tests, but to a lesser degree because of 
the more severe HASS environments. 
 
3. HASS may induce product degradation because of exposure to environments beyond 
the normal STS. HASS employs stresses that go beyond the normal field 
environments (i.e., beyond the normal STS environments). Hence, HASS may 
employ stresses considered to be outside of normal environment requirements in 
which operational reliability is not expected to be maintained, thereby potentially 
degrading or destroying the unit. Although “Safety of HASS” testing is performed to 
mitigate this risk, it is generally done on only one unit. Again, this is a challenge also 
faced in the E-test program, but HASS environments will likely be more challenging 
in this regard. 
 
4. Many Sandia products are one-shot devices that do not lend themselves to HASS 
techniques. HASS is geared towards products used repeatedly, as opposed to some 
DA hardware used once (one-shot devices). 
 
5. The ability of HASS to emulate the effectiveness of current testing vis-à-vis defect 
detection must be proven. E- and D-tests fulfill an important role in the overall testing 
program for DA components. They allow for the examination of product performance 
in, or following exposure to, various normal environmental extremes, thereby 
providing an important opportunity to detect defects that would otherwise go 
unnoticed. HASS would have to be carefully designed to be able to perform the same 
function as the E- and D-tests. In addition, E- and D-tests can identify defects (e.g., 
the presence of particles) in the product at an early stage; it would have to be 
demonstrated that HASS can also perform this function. 
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5.  MULTIPLE EXPOSURES 
 
How multiple tests (or exposures) are scored for reliability assessments is generally a gray area 
that is component-dependent. Decisions in this area are usually made as failures are found, rather 
than a priori. 
 
One approach to this issue is to take the position that units undergoing multiple (or cascading) 
tests are not to be counted multiple times; that is, a unit that undergoes two E-test suites, for 
example, is not counted the same as two units undergoing one E-test suite each. Also, if an E-test 
unit goes on to D-testing, it is counted as only one test (i.e., the E-test suite is considered to be a 
part of the D-test suite for the unit). An example of the first situation would be where a unit 
undergoes E-testing at the component level, followed by E-testing at the next assembly level. In 
this situation, the next assembly E-testing can be considered a continuation of the component-
level E-testing. The value of the next assembly E-tests is whether damage to the unit was 
incurred from insertion into the next assembly, as well as whether or not the unit works under 
next assembly conditions. The basis for this approach is that the next assembly E-test can be 
thought of as a continuation of the component-level E-test if different environments, or different 
environmental levels, are used. If a failure occurs, the ensuing investigation will determine what 
data are used to evaluate the probability of occurrence of the failure, as well as why the unit 
passed at the component level but failed at the next assembly level. 
 
The alternate approach to this issue is to take the position that cascading tests provide more 
opportunities for component failure; therefore, they should be counted individually rather than as 
only one suite of tests. As stated earlier, this is a component-specific decision. 
 
Another point to remember is that cascading E-tests (i.e., E-tests at succeeding levels of 
assembly) may have the potential of degrading a component by the time that it is yielded to the 
system. Therefore, testing environments for higher and lower level assemblies must be planned 
carefully to ensure agreement and that unacceptable degradation will not occur [2]. 
 
17 
6.  DETERMINATION OF THE NUMBER OF E- AND D-TEST SAMPLES 
 
During development, a reliability allocation, or requirement, is assigned to a component that 
supports an overall system reliability allocation. A reliability prediction, on the other hand, is 
based on inference or extrapolation from available data on similar designs. The allocation is used 
only if there is nothing else to use for reliability purposes; otherwise, the prediction is used. Note 
that the prediction might not be the same value as the allocation. 
 
As indicated in the Introduction, the reliability engineer attempts to make the best estimate 
possible of the probability that the hardware will function properly in use conditions. For a 
Bernoulli variable (i.e., pass/fail data), the point estimate is the maximum likelihood estimate. 
For reliability failure events having a low probability of occurrence, a considerable number of 
tests may be conducted without observing a failure. Thus, the point estimate of the failure 
probability, p, will be zero. An assessment of a zero failure rate may be accurate, but it could 
also be data-limited. Standard practice at Sandia National Laboratories is to use the initial 
prediction until sufficient data are accumulated to support a different assessment. This could 
occur in one of two ways: 
 
1. A failure occurs, in which case the point estimate is used for the reliability assessment, or 
2. Sufficient data without failure are collected to indicate that the initial prediction was 
overly conservative.  
 
In the second case, sufficient data are generally taken to be that number of tests such that if the 
true reliability were any worse than the prediction, then there would be at least a 50% chance of 
having seen one or more failures, that is, the 50% confidence bound. Because of the discrete 
nature of the binomial distribution, this value is called the 50% upper confidence limit (UCL) for 
p [3]. 
 
The number of samples needed to demonstrate the required reliability failure probability, without 
failures, at the 50% upper one-sided binomial confidence limit, is derived as follows: 
 
The one-sided upper binomial confidence limit on the failure probability, p, is the value that 
satisfies the following equation: 
        xnx
c
x
qp
x
n −
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∑ ⎟⎟⎠
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⎛=−
0
1 γ  
 
where  = confidence level, p = failure probability, c= no. of failures, n = no. of samples, and q 
= 1-p. 
 
The 50% upper confidence limit on the failure probability, for zero failures, is, therefore, using 
the above equation, where  = 0.5, c =0: 
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which reduces to: 
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The value for p that satisfies the above equation is the 50% UCL for p. Now take the natural log 
on both sides: 
  
     )]1[ln()1ln()5.0ln( pnp n −=−=  
     
For small values of p, ln(1-p)  -p. Also, ln(0.5) = -0.693  -0.7. 
 
Substituting yields: 
 
    ln(0.5)  -0.7 = n(-p) 
 
    Then n = 0.7/p   
 
This last equation provides the required number of both E- and D-test samples to demonstrate p 
(or q) at the 50% upper confidence limit, assuming zero failures. 
 
Thus, for a reliability requirement of 0.997, this means that p = 0.003 and therefore n = 0.7/0.003 
≈ 233 units are needed to demonstrate a reliability of 0.997 at the 50% upper confidence limit, 
assuming zero failures. Note that (0.997)233.3 = 0.496  0.5. 
 
Note that an exact solution would be ln(0.5) = n[ln(q)] = n[ln(.997)]. 
Then we get n = [ln(0.5)]/[ln(.997)] = -0.693/-0.003 = 231. Note that (.997)231 = 0.49955  0.5. 
 
It should be pointed out that, although the Binomial distribution is truly correct when the sample 
is drawn randomly from an infinite population, it provides a useful approximation in most cases 
[3]. 
 
When there are sufficient test data to show that the assessed reliability is better than that of the 
prediction, the assessed value is then reported. Furthermore, if there are no failures in the test 
data, then the 50% upper confidence limit for the failure probability is usually reported if it is 
better than the predicted value. 
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7.  ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF E- AND D-TESTING 
 
7.1 Advantages of E- and D-Testing 
 
It is perhaps helpful to discuss first the role played by E- and D-testing during production. This 
testing is one element of an entire weapon life cycle evaluation process. The ultimate objective 
of this entire suite of tests is to provide the opportunity to detect all classes of defects that may be 
present in the product. Because reliability is assessed over a range of operational capabilities and 
environments, and across the lifetime of the weapon, it is desired to test in such a way as to 
explore this state space efficiently. Note that statistically significant quantities of testing at any 
one environment are rarely obtained, even across the life of the program. Testing during 
production offers the opportunity to examine product performance at the component level, where 
more monitoring points tend to be available and environmental exposure is easier. One does not 
generally have the opportunity during production to examine synergisms between components or 
interface issues⎯these are the focus of the system-level testing done as part of the Stockpile 
Evaluation Program (although some limited information with respect to the interfaces is obtained 
during production tests at the next assembly level). Testing during production also provides an 
early opportunity to fix design or production problems that are detected through the tests; this 
helps to improve the inherent reliability of the product. Finally, production testing is a source of 
data to support reliability estimation. 
 
E-testing and D-testing have been designed to help achieve these objectives and to complement 
the other elements of life cycle stockpile stewardship by fulfilling an important role in the overall 
testing program for DA components. They allow for the examination of product performance in, 
or following exposure to, various realistic STS normal environmental extremes, thereby 
providing an important opportunity to detect defects that would otherwise go unnoticed, such as 
those defects (e.g., the presence of particles) that are in the product at an early stage. 
 
7.2 Limitations of E- and D-Testing 
 
No single test program can provide a check on all the important characteristics, such as aging 
effects, material incompatibilities, and combined environment behavior. Thus, E-testing and D-
testing have their limitations, as well, which include the following [3]: 
 
1. D-tests expend hardware, which is expensive. 
2. The E- and D-tests may not stimulate defects that arise because of dormant storage or 
material aging. 
3. Synergistic effects may not be detected. 
4. Test requirements may exceed use requirements. 
5. Not all environments can be tested. 
6. Combined environment effects may not be simulated. 
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8.  SUMMARY 
 
E-testing and D-testing provide data to the reliability engineer that is used to help determine 
whether or not a component is meeting its reliability requirement as it is being produced. D-
testing, in particular, not only provides a demonstration of product life, but also provides a check 
on the manufacturing process. 
 
The topics discussed in this report are intended to provide general guidelines to both the 
reliability engineer and the component designer. As stated in this report, there are no hard and 
fast rules regarding the nature of the E- and D-tests, other than that E-tests are not to be 
degrading to the component, and neither type of test must exceed the normal STS environment 
extremes. Judgments pertaining to the development of E- and D-tests, as well as how they are to 
be used for reliability scoring, must be done on a component or subsystem-specific basis. 
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